Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 123 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
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