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Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

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  • Parreiras, Sergio O.
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4DJBPGN-1/2/450546f338877a506f3f6226d68e31fe
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 123 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 210-217

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:123:y:2005:i:2:p:210-217

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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    References

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    1. Robert, Jacques, 1991. "Continuity in auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 169-179, October.
    2. Michael Peters, 1997. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers peters-97-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    3. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    4. Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    5. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
    6. Cremer, Jacques, 1982. "A simple proof of Blackwell's "comparison of experiments" theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 439-443, August.
    7. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
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    Cited by:
    1. Bose, Subir & Zhao, Jinhua, 2007. "Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 357-381, July.
    2. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
    3. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 118-141.

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