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Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

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Author Info
Segal, Ilya
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 113 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 147-181
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:113:y:2003:i:2:p:147-181

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  1. Attila Ambrus & Rosella Argenziano, 2004. "Network Markets and Consumer Coordination," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0423, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alexander Stremitzer, 2008. "Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs," Discussion Papers 224, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination," Working Paper Series 2006:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2007. "Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities," MPRA Paper 9143, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Arun Sundararajan, 2008. "Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1319-1319. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. In-Uck Park, 2004. "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1103-1103. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Daniel Seidmann, 2006. "Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule," Discussion Papers 2006-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  8. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Discussion Papers 0607-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Jonas Björnerstedt & Andreas Westermark, 2009. "The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 301-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gergely Csorba, 2004. "Screening Contracts in the Presence of Positive Network Effects," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0414, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Paul Belleflamme & Eric Toulemonde, 2007. "Negative Intra-Group Externalities in Two-Sided Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  12. David Spector, 2007. "Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure," PSE Working Papers 2007-07, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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