The electricity market game
AbstractThis paper examines the effects of imperfect competition in unregulated electricity markets from a general equilibrium perspective, and demonstrates that horizontal market power can explain both the large peak-period price spikes observed recently in California and elsewhere, and the marked reduction in additions to capacity that have also occurred during the transition to competitive markets.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 109 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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