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"Timing Is Everything" and Marital Bliss

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  • Blum, Yosef
  • Rothblum, Uriel G.

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  • Blum, Yosef & Rothblum, Uriel G., 2002. ""Timing Is Everything" and Marital Bliss," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 429-443, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:2:p:429-443
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
    2. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
    3. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-1480, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elette Boyle & Federico Echenique, 2009. "Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 87-99, June.
    2. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Common enrollment in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    3. Florian M. Biermann, 2011. "A Measure to compare Matchings in Marriage Markets," Discussion Paper Series dp575, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Péter Biró & Gethin Norman, 2013. "Analysis of stochastic matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 1021-1040, November.
    5. Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 456-468, March.
    6. Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July.
    7. Ágnes Cseh & Martin Skutella, 2019. "Paths to stable allocations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 835-862, September.

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