Monitoring multiple agents : The role of hierarchies
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 8 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
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- Peter Marko & Petr Svarc, 2008. "Firms formation and growth in the model with heterogeneous agents and monitoring," Working Papers IES 2008/31, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2008.
- Choi, Yoon K. & Merville, Larry J., 1995. "Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 27-33, January.
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