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Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development

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  • Al-Ubaydli, Omar

Abstract

Why do African and Middle Eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet USA, Australia and Norway seem blessed? A growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions. This paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system. The model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies. It also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes. I test the model's predictions using fixed-effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 81 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 137-152

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:1:p:137-152

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Keywords: Development; Natural resources; Authoritarianism; Democratization;

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Cited by:
  1. Al-Ubaydli, Omar & McCabe, Kevin & Twieg, Peter, 2014. "Can more be less? An experimental test of the resource curse," MPRA Paper 55381, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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