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An experimental dynamic public goods game with carryover

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  • Cadigan, John
  • Wayland, Patrick T.
  • Schmitt, Pamela
  • Swope, Kurtis

Abstract

We examine voluntary contributions in a two-stage public good experiment with ‘carryover.’ In two treatments, each subject's second-stage endowment is determined by the return from the public good in the first-stage. We manipulate payoffs across treatments such that, relative to our no-carryover baseline, earnings from either Nash Equilibrium (constant NE) play or Pareto Optimal (constant PO) play are held constant. The remaining two treatments maintain a constant endowment in each stage, but vary the marginal per capita return (MPCR high or MCPR low) to contributions in the second-stage. Our results indicate that carryover increases first-stage contributions. Our implementation of carryover enables us to examine the effects of changing endowments and a wide range of MPCR's. Consistent with the literature, we find that MPCR and endowment effects are important determinants of subject contributions to the group account. While stage 1 contributions tend to increase in the presence of carryover, efficiency levels across both stages fall relative to the baseline. Efficiency levels fall because the maximum earnings possible increase with carryover (due to higher endowments or MPCR levels in stage 2).

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 80 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 523-531

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:3:p:523-531

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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Keywords: Public Goods; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism; Dynamic; Carryover;

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Cited by:
  1. Grolleau , Gilles G. & Sutan, Angela & Vranceanu, Radu, 2013. "Taking the Well-being of Future Generations Seriously : Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School WP1313, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
  2. Marianna Baggio & Luigi Mittone, 2014. "An experimental approach to generational heterogeneity," CEEL Working Papers, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia 1404, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  3. Tiezzi, Silvia & Xiao, Erte, 2013. "Time Delay and Support for Taxation," MPRA Paper 51233, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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