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Noblesse oblige? Determinants of survival in a life-and-death situation

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Author Info

  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Savage, David A.
  • Torgler, Benno

Abstract

This paper explores what determines the survival of people in a life-and-death situation. The sinking of the Titanic allows us to inquire whether pro-social behavior matters in such extreme situations. This event can be considered a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical results suggest that social norms such as 'women and children first' persevered during such an event. Women of reproductive age and crew members had a higher probability of survival. Passenger class, fitness, group size, and cultural background also mattered.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 74 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (May)
Pages: 1-11

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:74:y:2010:i:1-2:p:1-11

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords: Decision under pressure Altruism Social norms Interdependent preferences Excess demand;

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References

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. On the ethics of research cloning
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-04-30 14:51:00
  2. Bruno Frey is in trouble
    by matthiasgreiff in Matthias Greiff on 2011-07-07 09:28:14
  3. Fairness, culture and selfish American men
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-01-20 10:41:00
  4. On the ethics of research cloning
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-04-30 14:51:00
  5. Bruno Frey is in trouble
    by matthiasgreiff in Matthias Greiff on 2011-07-07 09:28:14
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:
  1. Elinder, Mikael & Erixson, Oscar, 2012. "Every man for himself. Gender, Norms and Survival in Maritime Disasters," Working Paper Series 2012:8, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  2. Alexander L. Davis & John H. Miller & Roberto A. Weber, 2011. "Generosity across contexts," ECON - Working Papers 050, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  3. Eiji Yamamura, 2012. "Effect of Free Media on Views Regarding Nuclear Energy after the Fukushima Accident," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 132-141, 02.

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