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The empirical estimation of the cost-minimizing jury size and voting rule in civil trials

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  • King, Kerry A.
  • Nesbit, Todd M.

Abstract

Since the early 1970s, the literature examining the court system has placed much emphasis on the importance of the jury size and voting rule when analyzing the jury decision-making process. In addition, researchers have also used deductive reasoning to theoretically determine the cost-minimizing jury size and voting rule with regards to Type I and Type II errors. In this paper, we take this analysis one step further by empirically estimating the cost-minimizing jury size and voting rule in civil jury trials.

Suggested Citation

  • King, Kerry A. & Nesbit, Todd M., 2009. "The empirical estimation of the cost-minimizing jury size and voting rule in civil trials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 463-472, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:71:y:2009:i:2:p:463-472
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guarnaschelli, Serena & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2000. "An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 407-423, June.
    2. Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
    3. Coughlan, Peter J., 2000. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 375-393, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. McFadden, Daniel, 2012. "Economic juries and public project provision," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 166(1), pages 116-126.

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    Keywords

    Civil trial Jury size Voting rule;

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