Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The build-up of cooperative behavior among non-cooperative selfish agents

Contents:

Author Info

  • Benchekroun, Hassan
  • Long, Ngo Van

Abstract

We develop a theoretical model in which each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the satisfaction of all. We introduce a state variable that acts as a proxy for social capital of trustworthiness and that we call the stock of cooperation. We show that non-cooperative agents might condition their action on this state variable. Agents build-up the society's stock of cooperation and gradually overcome the free riding problem in a game of private contribution to a public good. We assume that there are neither penalties in the sense of trigger strategies, nor guilt and that each individual is rational.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-4PB0PG9-1/1/525d21d1293dc1a03f6e05139e1aba0c
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 67 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 239-252

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:67:y:2008:i:1:p:239-252

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January.
  2. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
  3. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
  4. Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1997. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 97-03, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  5. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, 9.
  6. Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, . ""Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences 99-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  7. Jun-ichi Itaya & Koji Shimomura, 1999. "A Dynamic Conjectural Variations Model in the Private Provision of Public Goods: a Differential Game Approach," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University 104, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  8. Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "When In Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0217, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  9. Miller, John H. & Andreoni, James, 1991. "Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 9-15, May.
  10. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846, August.
    • Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
  12. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
  13. Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1997. "Cooperation based on trust. An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 15-43, February.
  14. Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1999. "A Model of Cultural Transmission, Voting and Political Ideology," Papers, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie 1999-13, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
  15. Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1993. "Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 51-73.
  16. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002. "No Switchbacks: Rethinking Aspiration-Based Dynamics in the Ultimatum Game," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0218, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  17. Fershtman, C. & Nitzan, S., 1988. "Dynamic Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods," Papers, Tel Aviv 21-88, Tel Aviv.
  18. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
  19. Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
  20. Jeffrey Carpenter & Amrita Daniere & Lois Takahashi, 2003. "Cooperation, Trust, and Social Capital in Southeast Asian Urban Slums," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0309, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  21. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  22. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December.
  23. Wirl, Franz, 1996. "Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods: Extension to nonlinear strategies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 555-560, November.
  24. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, 9.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
  2. Castriota Stefano & Delmastro Marco, 2010. "Individual and Collective Reputation: Lessons from the Wine Market," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 149-172.
  3. Taiji Furusawa, 2009. "WTO as Moral Support," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(SI), pages 327-337, 05.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:67:y:2008:i:1:p:239-252. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.