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The effort effects of prizes in the second half of tournaments

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  • Lynch, James G.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

    Volume (Year): 57 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 1 (May)
    Pages: 115-129

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:57:y:2005:i:1:p:115-129

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    1. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-64, June.
    2. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
    3. John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1994. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," NBER Working Papers 4917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-79, April.
    5. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-24, December.
    6. Bull, Clive & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1985. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 85-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    7. Orszag, Jonathan M., 1994. "A new look at incentive effects and golf tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 77-88, September.
    8. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael L. Bognanno, 1990. "The incentive effects of tournaments revisited: Evidence from the European PGA tour," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 74-88, February.
    9. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
    10. James G. Lynch & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2000. "The Rewards to Running," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 1(4), pages 323-340, November.
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    Cited by:
    1. Christine Harbring & Gabriele K. Lünser, 2008. "On the Competition of Asymmetric Agents," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9, pages 373-395, 08.
    2. Firth, Michael & Leung, Tak Yan & Rui, Oliver M., 2010. "Justifying top management pay in a transitional economy," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 852-866, December.
    3. Alasdair Brown & Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2014. "The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action: Sabotage in Handicap Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 062, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias, 2010. "Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 180-191, August.
    5. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Kerstin Pull, 2007. "Tournament Incentives and Contestant Heterogeneity: Empirical Evidence from the Organizational Practice," Working Papers, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) 0075, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    6. Lin, Ming-Jen, 2008. "External market condition and tournaments: Theory and evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 75-78, April.

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