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What can we learn from cultural group selection and co-evolutionary models?

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  • Sethi, Rajiv
  • Somanathan, E.

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  • Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2004. "What can we learn from cultural group selection and co-evolutionary models?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 105-108, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:53:y:2004:i:1:p:105-108
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    3. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2001. "Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity," Working Papers 01-09-048, Santa Fe Institute.
    4. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000. "Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1057-1068, May.
    5. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April.
    6. Joel M. Guttman, 2003. "Repeated interaction and the evolution of preferences for reciprocity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 631-656, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dale Stahl, 2011. "Cooperation in the sporadically repeated prisoners’ dilemma via reputation mechanisms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 687-702, October.

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