Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Institutional determinants of military spending

Contents:

Author Info

  • Albalate, Daniel
  • Bel, Germà
  • Elias, Ferran

Abstract

Drawing on a database for 1988–2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form and democracy, electoral rules and concentration of parliamentary parties. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas its interaction with a majoritarian electoral rule reduces the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596711000758
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.

Volume (Year): 40 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 279-290

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:40:y:2012:i:2:p:279-290

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864

Related research

Keywords: Military spending; Politics; Institutions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
  2. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2006. "Military expenditure in post-conflict societies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 89-107, 01.
  3. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "State Capacity, Conflict and Development," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 010, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  4. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, . "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Working Papers 100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  5. M. Dolores Gadea & Eva Pardos & Claudia Perez-Fornies, 2004. "A Long-Run Analysis Of Defence Spending In The Nato Countries (1960-99)," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 231-249.
  6. Persson, T. & Roland, G. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Papers 633, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  7. Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," Papers 658, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  8. Timothy J. Besley & Torsten Persson, 2008. "The Incidence of Civil War: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 14585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "Repression or civil war?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 33748, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  10. Kees Jan Van Garderen & Chandra Shah, 2002. "Exact interpretation of dummy variables in semilogarithmic equations," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 5(1), pages 149-159, June.
  11. Eftychia Nikolaidou, 2008. "The Demand For Military Expenditure: Evidence From The Eu15 (1961-2005)," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 273-292.
  12. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2007. "Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 69(1), pages 1-27, 02.
  13. Paul Dunne & Sam Perlo-Freeman, 2003. "The Demand for Military Spending in Developing Countries," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 23-48.
  14. Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
  15. J. Paul Dunne & Sam Perlo-Freeman, 2003. "The demand for military spending in developing countries: A dynamic panel analysis," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 461-474.
  16. Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2005. "Does democracy preempt civil wars?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 445-465, June.
  17. J. Paul Dunne & Sam Perlo-Freeman & Ron Smith, 2008. "The Demand For Military Expenditure In Developing Countries: Hostility Versus Capability," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 293-302.
  18. Vincenzo Bove & Jennifer Brauner, 2011. "The Demand for Military Expenditure in Authoritarian Regimes," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1106, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  19. Paul Collier & Dominic Rohner, 2008. "Democracy, Development, and Conflict," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 531-540, 04-05.
  20. Julide Yildirim & Selami Sezgin, 2005. "Democracy and Military Expenditure: A Cross-Country Evidence," Transition Studies Review, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 93-100, 07.
  21. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2008. "Wars and State Capacity," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 522-530, 04-05.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Vincenzo Bove & Georgios Efthyvoulou, 2013. "Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs. Guns," Working Papers 2013016, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
  2. Christian Bj�rnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political Ideology and Economic Freedom Across Canadian Provinces," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 38(2), pages 143-166.
  3. Kimbambu Tsasa Vangu, Jean - Paul, 2012. "Analyse de la Relation Guerres Civiles et Croissance Économique
    [Civil Wars and Economic Growth in DRC]
    ," MPRA Paper 42424, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Feb 2012.
  4. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 155-179, January.
  5. Niklas Potrafke, 2010. "Ideology and cultural policy," TWI Research Paper Series 49, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  6. Vincenzo Bove & Roberto Nisticò, 2014. "Coups d'état and Defense Spending: A Counterfactual Analysis," CSEF Working Papers 366, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  7. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Cambini, Carlo & Rondi, Laura, 2012. "Reluctant Regulation," MPRA Paper 48073, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Potrafke, Niklas, 2010. "The growth of public health expenditures in OECD countries: Do government ideology and electoral motives matter?," Munich Reprints in Economics 19280, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:40:y:2012:i:2:p:279-290. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.