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The political economy of mobile telecommunications liberalization: Evidence from the OECD countries

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  • Duso, Tomaso
  • Seldeslachts, Jo

Abstract

The change from analogue to digital technologies in the mobile telecom industries at the beginning of the 1990s increased the economic rationale for rendering these markets more competitive. Yet, the speed of reforms have been remarkably different across countries. We empirically investigate this cross-sectional and temporal variation in entry liberalization of OECD countries during the 1990s. A unique data set obtained by merging different sources on political, government and regulatory institutions - as well as private interests and ideologies - allows us to explore in detail several dimensions of the political economy of liberalization. Our findings indicate majoritarian electoral systems as important drivers for change, while independent industry regulators slow down such reforms. Furthermore, powerful industry incumbents hold up the liberalization process and governing bodies that favor a small welfare state accelerate it. The focus on separate elements of countries' institutions aims to shed light on the underlying structure of decision-making processes, providing a base for more structural political economy studies on regulatory change.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.

Volume (Year): 38 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 199-216

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:38:y:2010:i:2:p:199-216

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864

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Keywords: Political economy Entry liberalization Mobile telecom Institutions Ideology Private interests OECD;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Christian Bj�rnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political Ideology and Economic Freedom Across Canadian Provinces," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 38(2), pages 143-166.
  2. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2011. "The political economy of electricity market liberalization: a cross-country approach," MPRA Paper 33724, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. FILIPPO BELLOC and ANTONIO NICITA, 2010. "Partisan Liberalizations. A New Puzzle from OECD Network Industries?," RSCAS Working Papers, European University Institute 2010/28, European University Institute.
  4. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2013. "Essays on Electricity Market Reforms: A Cross-Country Applied Approach," MPRA Paper 47139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Buccirossi, Paolo & Ciari, Lorenzo & Duso, Tomaso & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Vitale, Cristiana, 2009. "Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 283, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Cambini, Carlo & Rondi, Laura, 2013. "Reluctant regulation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 804-828.
  7. Osterloh, Steffen, 2012. "Words speak louder than actions: The impact of politics on economic performance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 318-336.
  8. Bernardo Bortolotti & Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi, 2011. "Regulatory Independence, Ownership and Firm Value: The Role of Political Institutions," RSCAS Working Papers, European University Institute 2011/43, European University Institute.
  9. Osterloh, Steffen & Debus, Marc, 2012. "Partisan politics in corporate taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 192-207.
  10. Filippo Belloc & Antonio Nicita, 2011. "The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?," International Review of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 121-145, June.
  11. Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi, 2011. "Independence, Investment and Political Interference: Evidence from the European Union," RSCAS Working Papers, European University Institute 2011/42, European University Institute.
  12. Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi, 2010. "Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2010.69, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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