Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Family involvement and new venture debt financing

Contents:

Author Info

  • Chua, Jess H.
  • Chrisman, James J.
  • Kellermanns, Franz
  • Wu, Zhenyu
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    New ventures often require debt financing but face difficulties convincing lenders of their creditworthiness because of agency problems. Researchers have shown that social capital can help small firms reduce lenders' agency concerns but new ventures do not yet have their own social capital. We propose that family involvement increases a venture's ability to borrow family social capital for the purpose of obtaining debt financing. Empirical tests with 1267 new ventures suggest that family involvement directly and indirectly improves a new venture's access to debt financing.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VDH-4XXNV5R-1/2/d3e6ea7a330378a077ad9e7d44332d35
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Business Venturing.

    Volume (Year): 26 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 (July)
    Pages: 472-488

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:jbvent:v:26:y:2011:i:4:p:472-488

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusvent

    Related research

    Keywords: Family business New ventures Debt financing Agency theory Social capital;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    3. Evans, David S & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1989. "An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 808-27, August.
    4. Steier, Lloyd, 2003. "Variants of agency contracts in family-financed ventures as a continuum of familial altruistic and market rationalities," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 597-618, September.
    5. William S. Schulze & Michael H. Lubatkin & Richard N. Dino, 2002. "Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of family firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 247-259.
    6. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    7. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1112, 06.
    8. Hooks, Linda M., 2003. "The impact of firm size on bank debt use," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 173-189.
    9. Chrisman, James J. & McMullan, Ed & Hall, Jeremy, 2005. "The influence of guided preparation on the long-term performance of new ventures," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 769-791, November.
    10. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May.
    11. Bates, Timothy, 1997. "Financing small business creation: The case of Chinese and Korean immigrant entrepreneurs," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 109-124, March.
    12. Steier, Lloyd, 2007. "New venture creation and organization: A familial sub-narrative," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(10), pages 1099-1107, October.
    13. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
    14. Wu, Zhenyu & Chua, Jess H. & Chrisman, James J., 2007. "Effects of family ownership and management on small business equity financing," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 875-895, November.
    15. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold B., 1979. "On financial contracting : An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-161, June.
    16. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    17. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
    18. Holtz-Eakin, D. & Joulfaian, D. & Rosen, H.S., 1992. "Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints," Papers 129, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
    19. John R. Graham, 2000. "How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 1901-1941, October.
    20. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    21. Bosse, Douglas A., 2009. "Bundling governance mechanisms to efficiently organize small firm loans," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 183-195, March.
    22. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    23. Masako Ueda, 2004. "Banks versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and Expropriation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 601-621, 04.
    24. Aldrich, Howard E. & Cliff, Jennifer E., 2003. "The pervasive effects of family on entrepreneurship: toward a family embeddedness perspective," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 573-596, September.
    25. Campbell, Tim S & Kracaw, William A, 1980. " Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(4), pages 863-82, September.
    26. Kaplan, Robert S & Urwitz, Gabriel, 1979. "Statistical Models of Bond Ratings: A Methodological Inquiry," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 231-61, April.
    27. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    28. Pollak, Robert A, 1985. "A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 581-608, June.
    29. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
    30. Jean-Luc Arregle & Michael A. Hitt & David G. Sirmon & Philippe Very, 2007. "The Development of Organizational Social Capital: Attributes of Family Firms," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 73-95, 01.
    31. Cassar, Gavin, 2004. "The financing of business start-ups," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 261-283, March.
    32. Anderson, Ronald C. & Mansi, Sattar A. & Reeb, David M., 2003. "Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 263-285, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Sanchez-Bueno, Maria J. & Usero, Belen, 2014. "How may the nature of family firms explain the decisions concerning international diversification?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(7), pages 1311-1320.
    2. Dunkelberg, William & Moore, Carmen & Scott, Jonathan & Stull, William, 2013. "Do entrepreneurial goals matter? Resource allocation in new owner-managed firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 225-240.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbvent:v:26:y:2011:i:4:p:472-488. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.