Chaebol-affiliated analysts: Conflicts of interest and market responses
AbstractSome Korean business groups, or chaebols, have a large stake in securities firms that issue analysts’ reports on their member companies. This structure is unique in that industrial companies and securities firms are affiliated and operate within the same group. We investigate the informational content of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices made by the chaebol-affiliated analysts, using data collected between 2000 and 2008. The chaebol analysts tend to make more optimistic earnings forecasts for the member companies. The mean EPS forecast error (5.36%) of the affiliated analysts for the same chaebol company are significantly larger than that (3.23%) of other chaebol and independent analysts. The chaebol analysts also assign better recommendations by almost one level and set target prices 2.5% higher to the member companies after controlling for company and analyst characteristics. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that chaebol analysts’ reports are biased by conflicts of interest. Stock market reactions do not differ in response to announcements of stock recommendations issued by affiliated vs. non-affiliated analysts. This suggests that capital markets do not recognize the conflicts of interest inherent in chaebol analysts’ reports.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.
Volume (Year): 36 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf
Business groups; Chaebols; Conflicts of interest; Analysts’ earnings forecasts; Stock recommendations; Target prices;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mehran, Hamid & Stulz, Rene M., 2007.
"The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 267-296, August.
- Mehran, Hamid & Stulz, Rene M., 2006. "The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions," Working Paper Series 2006-21, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
- Hamid Mehran & Rene M. Stulz, 2006. "The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions," NBER Working Papers 12695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baek, Jae-Seung & Kang, Jun-Koo & Suh Park, Kyung, 2004. "Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 265-313, February.
- Patricia C. O'Brien & Maureen F. Mcnichols & Lin Hsiou-Wei, 2005. "Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 623-650, 09.
- Barber, Brad M. & Lehavy, Reuven & Trueman, Brett, 2007. "Comparing the stock recommendation performance of investment banks and independent research firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 490-517, August.
- Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, 2003. "Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 313-351, 02.
- Ferris, Stephen P. & Kim, Kenneth A. & Kitsabunnarat, Pattanaporn, 2003. "The costs (and benefits?) of diversified business groups: The case of Korean chaebols," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 251-273, February.
- Ljungqvist, Alexander P & Marston, Felicia & Starks, Laura T & Wei, Kelsey D. & Yan, Hong, 2005.
"Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5001, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ljungqvist, Alexander & Marston, Felicia & Starks, Laura T. & Wei, Kelsey D. & Yan, Hong, 2007. "Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 420-456, August.
- Alon Brav & Reuven Lehavy, 2003. "An Empirical Analysis of Analysts' Target Prices: Short-term Informativeness and Long-term Dynamics," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 1933-1968, October.
- Cowen, Amanda & Groysberg, Boris & Healy, Paul, 2006. "Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 119-146, April.
- Jae-Seung Baek & Jun-Koo Kang & Inmoo Lee, 2006. "Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidencefrom Private Securities Offeringsby Korean Chaebols," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(5), pages 2415-2449, October.
- Houston, Joel & James, Christopher & Karceski, Jason, 2006. "What a Difference a Month Makes: Stock Analyst Valuations Following Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(01), pages 111-138, March.
- Shin, Hyun-Han & Park, Young S., 1999. "Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean 'chaebols'," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 169-191, June.
- Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009.
"Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
- Mitchell A. Petersen, 2005. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," NBER Working Papers 11280, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, 2008. "Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 503-537, 08.
- Lee, Sangwoo & Park, Kwangwoo & Shin, Hyun-Han, 2009. "Disappearing internal capital markets: Evidence from diversified business groups in Korea," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 326-334, February.
- Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-86.
- Gil S. Bae & Youngsoon S. Cheon & Jun-Koo Kang, 2008. "Intragroup Propping: Evidence from the Stock-Price Effects of Earnings Announcements by Korean Business Groups," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(5), pages 2015-2060, September.
- Kee-Hong Bae & Jun-Koo Kang & Jin-Mo Kim, 2002. "Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2695-2740, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.