The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.
Volume (Year): 31 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf
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