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A primer on monetary and fiscal policy

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  • Sargent, Thomas J.

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  • Sargent, Thomas J., 1999. "A primer on monetary and fiscal policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1463-1482, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:23:y:1999:i:10:p:1463-1482
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    1. Thomas J. Sargent, 1973. ""Rational Expectations": A Correction," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 4(3), pages 799-800.
    2. David T. Beers & Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1983. "Speculations about the speculation against the Hong Kong dollar," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 7(Fall).
    3. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1995. "The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 73-96, Fall.
    4. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    5. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    6. Thomas J. Sargent, 1973. "Rational Expectations, the Real Rate of Interest, and the Natural Rate of Unemployment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 4(2), pages 429-480.
    7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Introduction to Macroeconomic Policy
      by Agent Continuum in Agent Continuum on 2009-12-04 01:39:27

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    Cited by:

    1. Willi Semmler & Wenlang Zhang, 2004. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in the Euro Area," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-227, June.
    2. Barnett, Richard C., 2005. "Coordinating macroeconomic policy in a simple AK growth model," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 621-647, December.
    3. Raghbendra Jha, 2001. "Macroeconomics of Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-71, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Tibor Tatay & Zsanett Orlovits & Zsuzsanna Novák, 2022. "Inhomogeneous Financial Markets in a Low Interest Rate Environment—A Cluster Analysis of Eurozone Economies," Risks, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-22, October.
    5. Gu, Jingping & Li, Qi & Yang, Jian, 2013. "Fiscal deficits and mean reversion in real exchange rates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 300-303.
    6. George S. Tavlas, 2003. "The Economics of Exchange‐Rate Regimes: A Review Essay," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(8), pages 1215-1246, August.
    7. Chatziantoniou, Ioannis & Duffy, David & Filis, George, 2013. "Stock market response to monetary and fiscal policy shocks: Multi-country evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 754-769.
    8. Luis F. Céspedes C. & Claudio Soto G., 2006. "Inflation Targeting And Monetary Policy Credibility In Chile," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 9(3), pages 53-70, December.
    9. Battilossi, Stefano, 2003. "Capital mobility and financial repression in Italy, 1960-1990 : a public finance perspective," IFCS - Working Papers in Economic History.WH wh030602, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto Figuerola.
    10. Camilleri, Silvio John & Scicluna, Nicolanne & Bai, Ye, 2019. "Do stock markets lead or lag macroeconomic variables? Evidence from select European countries," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 170-186.
    11. Jansen, Dennis W. & Li, Qi & Wang, Zijun & Yang, Jian, 2008. "Fiscal policy and asset markets: A semiparametric analysis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 141-150, November.
    12. Heinz Handler, 2006. "Staatsausgaben und Wirtschaftswachstum in Europa. Der Beitrag der öffentlichen Ausgaben zur Lissabon-Strategie," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 26583, February.
    13. Wenli Cheng & Simon D. Angus, 2012. "The Cantillon Effect of Money Injection through Deficit Spending," Monash Economics Working Papers 12-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    14. Cortes, Gustavo S. & Gao, George P. & Silva, Felipe B.G. & Song, Zhaogang, 2022. "Unconventional monetary policy and disaster risk: Evidence from the subprime and COVID–19 crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    15. Gern, Klaus-Jürgen & Kamps, Christophe & Scheide, Joachim, 2001. "Euroland: Konjunkturschwäche wird überwunden," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2656, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    16. Silva, Felipe Bastos Gurgel, 2021. "Fiscal Deficits, Bank Credit Risk, and Loan-Loss Provisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(5), pages 1537-1589, August.

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