Controlling shareholders' tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China
AbstractConflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders could affect executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we use data on Chinese listed companies and show that controlling shareholders' tunneling reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. These results suggest that while incentive payment schemes are generally adopted in Chinese listed companies, controlling shareholders who obtain private benefits from listed companies have less incentive to strengthen the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.
Volume (Year): 30 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jaccpubpol
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- Conyon, Martin J. & He, Lerong, 2011. "Executive compensation and corporate governance in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1158-1175, September.
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