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Proxy advisory firms and stock option repricing

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  • Larcker, David F.
  • McCall, Allan L.
  • Ormazabal, Gaizka

Abstract

This paper examines the economic consequences associated with the board of director’s choice of whether to adhere to proxy advisory firm policies in the design of stock option repricing programs. Proxy advisors provide research and voting recommendations to institutional investors on issues subject to a shareholder vote. Since many institutional investors follow the recommendations of proxy advisors in their voting, proxy advisor policies are an important consideration for corporate boards in the development of programs that require shareholder approval such as stock option repricing programs. Using a comprehensive sample of stock option repricings announced between 2004 and 2009, we find that repricing firms following the restrictive policies of proxy advisors exhibit statistically lower market reactions to the repricing, lower operating performance, and higher employee turnover. These results are consistent with the conclusion that proxy advisory firm recommendations regarding stock option repricings are not value increasing for shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Larcker, David F. & McCall, Allan L. & Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2013. "Proxy advisory firms and stock option repricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 149-169.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:56:y:2013:i:2:p:149-169
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.05.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Hodak, 2014. "The Growing Executive Compensation Advantage of Private Versus Public Companies," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 26(1), pages 20-28, March.
    2. Colonnello, Stefano, 2020. "Executive compensation, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).
    3. Yonca Ertimur & Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, 2013. "Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 951-996, December.
    4. Büchel, Berno & Mechtenberg, Lydia & Wagner, Alexander F., 2023. "When Do Proxy Advisors Improve Corporate Decisions?," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277704, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Brunarski, Kelly R. & Campbell, T. Colin & Harman, Yvette S., 2015. "Evidence on the outcome of Say-On-Pay votes: How managers, directors, and shareholders respond," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 132-149.
    6. Artiga González, Tanja & Calluzzo, Paul & Granic, Georg D., 2023. "Ballot order effects in independent director elections," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C).
    7. Ferri, Fabrizio & Oesch, David, 2013. "Management Influence on Investors: Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay," Working Papers on Finance 1329, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    8. Gulen, Huseyin & O'Brien, William J., 2017. "Option repricing, corporate governance, and the effect of shareholder empowerment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 389-415.
    9. David F. Larcker & Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, 2015. "Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(1), pages 173-204.
    10. Yonca Ertimur & Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, 2018. "Understanding Uncontested Director Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(7), pages 3400-3420, July.
    11. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Jochem, Torsten & Rajamani, Anjana, 2020. "Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15523, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Rachelle Belinga & Blanche Segrestin, 2016. "Proxy voting policies as tools for shareholder engagement in CSR: an exploratory study," Post-Print hal-01312918, HAL.
    13. Choonsik Lee & Matthew E. Souther, 2020. "Managerial Reliance on the Retail Shareholder Vote: Evidence from Proxy Delivery Methods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(4), pages 1717-1736, April.
    14. Christie Hayne & Marshall Vance, 2019. "Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 969-1011, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Proxy advisory firms; Stock option repricing; Institutional shareholder voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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