Discussion of "The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting"
AbstractRamanna [2007. The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting, Journal of Accounting and Economics] provides interesting and novel evidence on how firms use contributions from their political action committees (PACs) to members of Congress as a means of lobbying for preferred positions on the two exposure drafts that led to SFAS-141 and SFAS-142. My discussion raises some concerns about his main conclusion: that pooling firms lobbied the FASB to obtain a "fair-value"-based impairment rule to facilitate their ability to manipulate financial statements. I offer a more benign explanation and make some other observations about how this line of research could proceed in the future.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.
Volume (Year): 45 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (August)
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- Inès Bouden & Luc Paugam & Olivier Ramond, 2011. "Les déterminants de la dépréciation du goodwill : proposition d'un cadre d'analyse," Post-Print hal-00646810, HAL.
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