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Agency problems of excess endowment holdings in not-for-profit firms

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  • Core, John E.
  • Guay, Wayne R.
  • Verdi, Rodrigo S.

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  • Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne R. & Verdi, Rodrigo S., 2006. "Agency problems of excess endowment holdings in not-for-profit firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 307-333, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:41:y:2006:i:3:p:307-333
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    1. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 1994. "What do firms do with cash windfalls?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 337-360, December.
    2. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    3. Opler, Tim & Pinkowitz, Lee & Stulz, Rene & Williamson, Rohan, 1999. "The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 3-46, April.
    4. Mihir A. Desai & Robert J. Yetman, 2005. "Constraining Managers without Owners: Governance of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise," NBER Working Papers 11140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    6. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    7. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    8. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Hansmann, Henry, 1990. "Why Do Universities Have Endowments?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 3-42, January.
    10. Gentry, William M., 2002. "Debt, investment and endowment accumulation: the case of not-for-profit hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 845-872, September.
    11. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    12. Posnett, John & Sandler, Todd, 1989. "Demand for charity donations in private non-profit markets : The case of the U.K," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 187-200, November.
    13. Weisbrod, Burton A. & Dominguez, Nestor D., 1986. "Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 83-96, June.
    14. Jarrad Harford, 1999. "Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1969-1997, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphael Duguay & Michael Minnis & Andrew Sutherland, 2020. "Regulatory Spillovers in Common Audit Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3389-3411, August.
    2. Verbruggen, Sandra & Vlassenroot, Karolien & Christiaens, Johan, 2010. "Agency consequences of government funding in nonprofit organizations," Working Papers 2010/36, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    3. David Adeabah & Charles Andoh & Simplice A. Asongu & Isaac Akomea-Frimpong, 2021. "Elections, Political Connections and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Local Assemblies," Research Africa Network Working Papers 21/004, Research Africa Network (RAN).
    4. Andres Ramirez, 2011. "Nonprofit Cash Holdings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(5), pages 653-681, September.
    5. Joseph Hughes, 2013. "A New Cost Efficiency Measure for Not-for-Profit Firms: Evidence of a Link Between Inefficiency and Large Endowments," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 41(3), pages 279-300, September.
    6. Qianhua Ling & Daniel Gordon Neely, 2012. "Implications of Being a Highly Rated Organization: Evidence from Four-Star Rated Nonprofits," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1-3, May.
    7. Steven Balsam & Erica E. Harris, 2018. "Nonprofit executive incentive pay," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 1665-1714, December.
    8. Bolton, Patrick & Mehran, Hamid, 2006. "An introduction to the governance and taxation of not-for-profit organizations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 293-305, September.
    9. Jeffrey R. Brown & Stephen G. Dimmock & Jun-Koo Kang & Scott J. Weisbenner, 2014. "How University Endowments Respond to Financial Market Shocks: Evidence and Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 931-962, March.
    10. Chia‐Chun Chiang & Hugh Hoikwang Kim & Greg Niehaus, 2022. "Opaque liabilities, learning, and the cost of equity capital for insurers," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(4), pages 1031-1076, December.
    11. Bengtsson, Ola & Hand, John R.M., 2011. "CEO compensation in venture-backed firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 391-411, July.
    12. Hanlon, Michelle & Lester, Rebecca & Verdi, Rodrigo, 2015. "The effect of repatriation tax costs on U.S. multinational investment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 179-196.
    13. Newton, Ashley N., 2015. "Executive compensation, organizational performance, and governance quality in the absence of owners," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 195-222.
    14. Hofmann, Mary Ann & McSwain, Dwayne, 2013. "Financial disclosure management in the nonprofit sector: A framework for past and future research," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 61-87.
    15. Aggarwal, Rajesh K. & Evans, Mark E. & Nanda, Dhananjay, 2012. "Nonprofit boards: Size, performance and managerial incentives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 466-487.
    16. Raphael Duguay, 2022. "The Economic Consequences of Financial Audit Regulation in the Charitable Sector," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 1463-1498, September.
    17. Andrew R. Finley & Curtis Hall & Erica Harris & Stephen J. Lusch, 2021. "The Effect of Large Corporate Donors on Non-profit Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 463-485, September.
    18. Elizabeth A. M. Searing, 2021. "Resilience in Vulnerable Small and New Social Enterprises," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(24), pages 1-21, December.
    19. Bae, Kee-Hong & Kim, Seung-Bo & Kim, Woochan, 2012. "Family control and expropriation at not-for-profit organizations: evidence from korean private universities," MPRA Paper 44029, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Chen, Yangyang & Murgulov, Zoltan & Rhee, S. Ghon & Veeraraghavan, Madhu, 2016. "Religious beliefs and local government financing, investment, and cash holding decisions," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(PA), pages 258-271.

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