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The impact of the number of courts on the demand for trials

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  • Chappe, Nathalie
  • Obidzinski, Marie

Abstract

The recent reforms of the “judicial map” in Europe have drastically reduced the number of courts, raising fears of a decline in access to justice. This paper addresses this issue through a litigation model within a Salop (1979) framework. We assume that victims of accidents differ both in terms of compensatory damages expected and in terms of distance from court. Due to distance costs, it might be too expensive to file cases for some victims with low expected awards. We show that the link between the number of courts and the demand for trials is not clear cut when the probability of an accident occurring is determined by the defendant through his level of care. Reducing the number of courts can, under certain conditions, increases the amount of care taken by the defendant.

Suggested Citation

  • Chappe, Nathalie & Obidzinski, Marie, 2014. "The impact of the number of courts on the demand for trials," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 121-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:37:y:2014:i:c:p:121-125
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2013.09.002
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    1. Brekke, Kurt R. & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2008. "Competition and waiting times in hospital markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1607-1628, July.
    2. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    3. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer.
    4. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1988. "The deterrent effects of settlements and trials," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-116, June.
    5. Gravelle, H. S. E., 1990. "Rationing trials by waiting: Welfare implications," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 255-270, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friehe Tim & Miceli Thomas J., 2017. "A Note on Trial Delay and Social Welfare: The Impact of Multiple Equilibria," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-15, March.
    2. Stéphane Esquerré, 2019. "Don't feed the zombies Essay on survival of bankrupt firms in French bankrupcty courts," Working Papers hal-02305501, HAL.
    3. Espinosa, Romain & Desrieux, Claudine & Ferracci, Marc, 2018. "Labor market and access to justice," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 1-16.
    4. Romain Espinosa & Claudine Desrieux & Hengrui Wan, 2017. "Fewer courts, less justice? Evidence from the 2008 French reform of labor courts," Post-Print halshs-01634211, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Litigation; Number of courts; Distance costs; Access to justice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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