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"Whistle Blowing" Regulation and Accounting Standards Enforcement in Germany and Europe--An Economic Perspective

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  • Schmidt, Matthias

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  • Schmidt, Matthias, 2005. ""Whistle Blowing" Regulation and Accounting Standards Enforcement in Germany and Europe--An Economic Perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 143-168, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:143-168
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    13. Dworkin, Terry Morehead & Near, Janet P., 1997. "A Better Statutory Approach to Whistle-blowing," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1-16, January.
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    19. Matthias Schmidt, 2002. "On The Legitimacy Of Accounting Standard Setting By Privately Organised Institutions In Germany And Europe," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 54(2), pages 171-193, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2020. "Whistleblower protection: Theory and experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    2. Paul Andon & Clinton Free & Radzi Jidin & Gary S. Monroe & Michael J. Turner, 2018. "The Impact of Financial Incentives and Perceptions of Seriousness on Whistleblowing Intention," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 165-178, August.
    3. Esther Pittroff, 2016. "Whistle-blowing regulation in different corporate governance systems: an analysis of the regulation approaches from the view of path dependence theory," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(4), pages 703-727, December.
    4. Aiyesha Dey & Jonas Heese & Gerardo Pérez‐Cavazos, 2021. "Cash‐for‐Information Whistleblower Programs: Effects on Whistleblowing and Consequences for Whistleblowers," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(5), pages 1689-1740, December.
    5. Reuben, Ernesto & Stephenson, Matthew, 2012. "Nobody Likes a Rat: On the Willingness and Consequences of Reporting Lies," IZA Discussion Papers 6998, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, 2008. "Decentralized enforcement in organizations: An experimental approach," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(2), pages 165-192, June.
    7. Sebastian Oelrich, 2019. "Making regulation fit by taking irrationality into account: the case of the whistleblower," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 12(1), pages 175-207, April.
    8. Hervé Stolowy & Yves Gendron & Jodie Moll & Luc Paugam, 2019. "Building the Legitimacy of Whistleblowers: A Multi‐Case Discourse Analysis," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 7-49, March.
    9. Olayinka Erin & Omololu Adex Bamigboye, 2020. "Does whistleblowing framework influence earnings management? An empirical investigation," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(2), pages 111-122, September.
    10. Gladys Lee & Esther Pittroff & Michael J. Turner, 2020. "Is a Uniform Approach to Whistle-Blowing Regulation Effective? Evidence from the United States and Germany," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 553-576, May.
    11. Elka Johansson & Peter Carey, 2016. "Detecting Fraud: The Role of the Anonymous Reporting Channel," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 139(2), pages 391-409, December.
    12. Seifert, Deborah L. & Sweeney, John T. & Joireman, Jeff & Thornton, John M., 2010. "The influence of organizational justice on accountant whistleblowing," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 707-717, October.

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