This paper empirically investigates the induced effect of a more and less transparent central bank intervention (CBI) policy on rumors that can emerge. Using the case of Japan, we estimate a dynamic-probit model that explains the main determinants of false reports (i.e. falsely reported interventions) and anticipative rumors (i.e. rumors about future interventions) with reference to the intervention strategy adopted by the central bank for actual and oral interventions, and the uncertainty climate of the market captured by two volatility measures. Our results suggest that the induced effect of a transparent CBI policy on market rumors critically depends on the type of speeches made by officials.
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Volume (Year): 19 (2009) Issue (Month): 1 (February) Pages: 94-111 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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