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Internal and external stability of bidder cartels in auctions and public tenders: A comparison of pricing rules

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Author Info
Fehl, Ulrich
Guth, Werner
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8P-4GXVY28-4/2/dd62ee39cf91a024cc201541dc5eb2b7
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 5 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 303-313
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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:5:y:1987:i:3:p:303-313

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  1. Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, . "Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Selective Survey of Recent Research," Working Papers 01014, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 15-16, pages 11, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Discussion Papers 817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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