Endogenous product choice: A progress report
AbstractEmpirical models of differentiated product demand are widely used by both academics and practitioners. While these methods treat carefully the potential endogeneity of price, until recently they have assumed the number and characteristics of the products offered by firms are exogenous. This paper presents a progress report on an ongoing research agenda to address this issue. First, it summarizes how the appropriate choice of “orthogonal” instruments can yield consistent estimates of own and cross-price elasticities in the presence of endogenous product characteristics. Second, it summarizes how to measure “quality markups” and the welfare consequences of endogenous product quality in U.S. cable television markets. Related papers and extensions to consider multiple product characteristics and dynamics are also discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 30 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Endogenous product choice; Endogenous product characteristics; Endogenous quality; Orthogonal instruments; Welfare; Cable television;
Other versions of this item:
- Crawford, Gregory S, 2012. "Endogenous Product Choice: A Progress Report," CEPR Discussion Papers 8862, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Crawford, Gregory S., 2012. "Endogenous Product Choice : A Progress Report," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 979, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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