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Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market

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  • Xiao, Mo
  • Orazem, Peter F.

Abstract

We study the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct in an adapted Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1994) framework. In our framework, entrants incur sunk costs to enter, while incumbents disregard these costs in deciding on continuation or exit. We apply this framework to study entry and competition in the local U.S. broadband markets from 1999 to 2003. Ignoring sunk costs generates unreasonable variation in firms' competitive conduct over time. This variation disappears when entry costs are allowed. Once the market has one to three incumbent firms, the fourth entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 29 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 547-561

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:5:p:547-561

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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Keywords: Entry Market structure Sunk costs Broadband market;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Chou, Shin-Yi & Deily, Mary E. & Li, Suhui & Lu, Yi, 2014. "Competition and the impact of online hospital report cards," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 42-58.
  2. Jason Chan & Anindya Ghose & Robert Seamans, 2013. "The Internet and Hate Crime: Offline Spillovers from Online Access," Working Papers 13-02, NET Institute.
  3. Nishida, Mitsukuni & Gil, Ricard, 2014. "Regulation, enforcement, and entry: Evidence from the Spanish local TV industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 11-23.

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