IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v29y2011i4p464-472.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Entry deterrence and experimentation under demand uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Jain, Neelam

Abstract

We examine the effect of a threat of entry on experimentation about demand by an incumbent monopolist when there is a fixed cost of entry. We show that experimentation may itself be used as a tool for entry deterrence and derive conditions under which experimentation reduces the probability of entry. These conditions depend on the entry rule which in turn depends on entry costs. We show that if experimentation does not deter entry, the monopolist incumbent experiments less. We also characterize experimentation and entry in the linear-uniform example, and show that cost of entry and experimentation do not have a monotonic relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • Jain, Neelam, 2011. "Entry deterrence and experimentation under demand uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 464-472, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:464-472
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718710001189
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Neelam Jain & Thomas Jeitschko & Leonard Mirman, 2005. "Entry deterrence under financial intermediation with private information and hidden contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(3), pages 203-225, August.
    2. Mirman Leonard J. & Samuelson Larry & Schlee Edward E., 1994. "Strategic Information Manipulation in Duopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 363-384, April.
    3. Dolores Alepuz, M. & Urbano, Amparo, 1999. "Duopoly experimentation: Cournot competition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 165-188, March.
    4. Neelam Jain & Thomas Jeitschko & Leonard Mirman, 2002. "Strategic Experimentation in Financial Intermediation with Threat of Entry," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 114(1), pages 203-227, August.
    5. Matthews, Steven A & Mirman, Leonard J, 1983. "Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 981-996, July.
    6. Mirman, Leonard J & Samuelson, Larry & Urbano, Amparo, 1993. "Monopoly Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 549-563, August.
    7. Neelam Jain & Thomas D. Jeitschko & Leonard J. Mirman, 2003. "Financial intermediation and entry-deterrence," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(4), pages 793-815, November.
    8. Belleflamme, Paul & Bloch, Francis, 2001. "Price and quantity experimentation: A synthesis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(10), pages 1563-1582, December.
    9. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    10. Dimitrova, Magdalena & Schlee, Edward E., 2003. "Monopoly, competition and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1623-1642, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Neelam Jain & Leonard Mirman, 2011. "Lender learning and entry under general demand uncertainty," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(2), pages 163-175, June.
    2. Dimitrova, Magdalena & Schlee, Edward E., 2003. "Monopoly, competition and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1623-1642, December.
    3. Ruben Geer & Arnoud V. Boer & Christopher Bayliss & Christine S. M. Currie & Andria Ellina & Malte Esders & Alwin Haensel & Xiao Lei & Kyle D. S. Maclean & Antonio Martinez-Sykora & Asbjørn Nilsen Ris, 2019. "Dynamic pricing and learning with competition: insights from the dynamic pricing challenge at the 2017 INFORMS RM & pricing conference," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 18(3), pages 185-203, June.
    4. Cunha-e-Sa, Maria A. & Santos, Vasco, 2008. "Experimentation with accumulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 470-496, February.
    5. Belleflamme, Paul & Bloch, Francis, 2001. "Price and quantity experimentation: A synthesis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(10), pages 1563-1582, December.
    6. Maria Antonieta Cunha-e-Sa & Vasco Santos, 2007. "Experimentation with accumulation," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp503, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    7. Ruben van de Geer & Arnoud V. den Boer & Christopher Bayliss & Christine Currie & Andria Ellina & Malte Esders & Alwin Haensel & Xiao Lei & Kyle D. S. Maclean & Antonio Martinez-Sykora & Asbj{o}rn Nil, 2018. "Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Competition: Insights from the Dynamic Pricing Challenge at the 2017 INFORMS RM & Pricing Conference," Papers 1804.03219, arXiv.org.
    8. Alexander, Corinne E., 2002. "The Role Of Seed Company Supplied Information In Farmers' Decisions," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19617, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    9. Iñaki Aguirre, 1999. "Information transmission and incentives not to price discriminate," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 283-299.
    10. Yang, Bill Z., 1996. "Learning, reputation and entry deterrence: A chain-store game with correlated entrants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 561-573, July.
    11. Leonard J. Mirman & Thomas D. Jeitschko, 2002. "Information and experimentation in short-term contracting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(2), pages 311-331.
    12. Fishman, Arthur & Gandal, Neil, 1994. "Experimentation and learning with networks effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 103-108.
    13. Dolores Alepuz, M. & Urbano, Amparo, 1999. "Duopoly experimentation: Cournot competition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 165-188, March.
    14. Agbo, Maxime, 2014. "Strategic exploitation with learning and heterogeneous beliefs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 126-140.
    15. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, January.
    16. Schlee, Edward E., 2001. "Buyer experimentation and introductory pricing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 347-362, March.
    17. Rafael Moner‐Colonques & Vicente Orts & José J. Sempere‐Monerris, 2008. "Entry in Foreign Markets under Asymmetric Information and Demand Uncertainty," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(4), pages 1105-1122, April.
    18. Daher, Wassim & Mirman, Leonard J. & Santugini, Marc, 2012. "Information in Cournot: Signaling with incomplete control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 361-370.
    19. X. Henry Wang & Bill Yang, 2003. "Why Competition may Discourage Students from Learning? A Behavioral Economic Analysis," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 117-128.
    20. Bipasa Datta, "undated". "Experimentation, Information sharing and Oligopoly Limit Pricing," Discussion Papers 99/34, Department of Economics, University of York.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entry Experimentation Learning;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:464-472. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.