Quantity competition with access fees
AbstractWe analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees. Per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm. In a Nash equilibrium of the game played by firms, the per unit prices equal mairginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 19 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
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