Procurement auctions with entry of bidders
AbstractIn procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort. If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction, then decreasing the firms' rent may imply reduced entry.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 18 (2000)
Issue (Month): 8 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Other versions of this item:
- Kjerstad, E. & Vagstad, S., 2000. "Procurement Auctions with Entry of Bidders," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 215, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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