Infant-industry tariff protection with pressure groups
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 16 (1998)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
- Eugenio J. Miravete, 1993. "Learning by Doing and Protection of an Infant-Industry," Discussion Papers 1097, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Noll, Roger G., 1989. "Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1253-1287 Elsevier.
- Allen, Robert C., 1979. "International Competition in Iron and Steel, 1850–1913," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(04), pages 911-937, December.
- Hiroshi Ohashi, 2004.
"Learning by Doing, Export Subsidies, and Industry Growth: Japanese Steel in the 1950s and 1960s,"
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- Ohashi, Hiroshi, 2005. "Learning by doing, export subsidies, and industry growth: Japanese steel in the 1950s and 1960s," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 297-323, July.
- Kaneda, Mitsuhiro, 2003. "Policy designs in a dynamic model of infant industry protection," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 91-115, October.
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