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Service production and contract choice in primary physician services

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  • Sorensen, Rune J.
  • Grytten, Jostein

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  • Sorensen, Rune J. & Grytten, Jostein, 2003. "Service production and contract choice in primary physician services," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 73-93, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:66:y:2003:i:1:p:73-93
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fredrik Carlsen & Jostein Grytten, 1998. "More physicians: improved availability or induced demand?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(6), pages 495-508, September.
    2. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    3. Rizzo, John A. & Blumenthal, David, 1994. "Physician labor supply: Do income effects matter?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 433-453.
    4. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    5. Hausman, Dan & Le Grand, Julian, 1999. "Incentives and health policy: primary and secondary care in the British National Health Service," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 49(10), pages 1299-1307, November.
    6. Edward P. Lazear, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," NBER Working Papers 6957, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Rune J. Sørensen & Jostein Grytten, 1999. "Competition and supplier‐induced demand in a health care system with fixed fees," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(6), pages 497-508, September.
    8. Scott, Anthony, 2000. "Economics of general practice," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1175-1200, Elsevier.
    9. Jostein Grytten & Fredrik Carlsen & Irene Skau, 2001. "The income effect and supplier induced demand. Evidence from primary physician services in Norway," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(11), pages 1455-1467.
    10. Rune Sørensen & Jostein Grytten, 2000. "Contract design for primary care physicians: Physician location and practice behaviour in small communities," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 151-157, February.
    11. Martin Gaynor & Paul Gertler, 1995. "Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 591-613, Winter.
    12. Carlsen, Fredrik & Grytten, Jostein, 2000. "Consumer satisfaction and supplier induced demand," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 731-753, September.
    13. Gaynor, Martin & Pauly, Mark V, 1990. "Compensation and Productive Efficiency of Partnerships: Evidence from Medical Group Practice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 544-573, June.
    14. Grytten, Jostein & Sorensen, Rune, 2001. "Type of contract and supplier-induced demand for primary physicians in Norway," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 379-393, May.
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