The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
AbstractWe study how aggregate effort exerted in contests between groups of heterogeneous players depends on the sorting of players into groups. We show that the optimal sorting depends on the curvature of the effort cost function. From the perspective of a contest organizer whose objective is to maximize aggregate effort, it is optimal to sort players in a way that minimizes the variation in ability across groups if the effort cost function is moderately steep. However, for a sufficiently steep effort cost function, the optimal sorting of players may be the one that maximizes the variation in ability across groups.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 73 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Tournament design; Sorting; Contest; Groups; Heterogeneous players;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
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- Yann Girard & Florian Hett, 2013. "Competitiveness in dynamic group contests: Evidence from combined field and lab data," Working Papers 1303, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Apr 2013.
- Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2014.
"Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 219-238, June.
- Philip Brookins & John Lightle & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "An experimental study of sorting in group contests," Working Papers wp2014_01_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2014. "Cost Sharing in Collective Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4825, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kolmar, Martin & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2013. "Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 9-22.
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