Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case
AbstractA non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann's agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an interpersonal-intrastate comparison of knowledge.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 69 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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