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The aggregate-monotonic core

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  • Calleja, Pedro
  • Rafels, Carles
  • Tijs, Stef
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    Abstract

    We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 742-748

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:742-748

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    Keywords: Cooperative games Core Aggregate-monotonicity;

    References

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    1. David Housman & (*), Lori Clark, 1998. "Note Core and monotonic allocation methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 611-616.
    2. Kannai, Yakar, 1992. "The core and balancedness," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 355-395 Elsevier.
    3. Moulin, H, 1990. "Cores and Large Cores When Population Varies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 219-32.
    4. J. R. G. van Gellekom & J. A. M. Potters & J. H. Reijnierse, 1999. "Prosperity properties of TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 211-227.
    5. Ichiishi, T, 1990. "Comparative Cooperative Game Theory," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 139-52.
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    Cited by:
    1. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2012. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 899-913, November.
    2. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2010. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," Working Papers in Economics 237, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    3. J. Arin, 2013. "Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 325-337, May.

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