Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
AbstractThis paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel and Moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria [Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 1995a. Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 619-637]. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 65 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Bargaining Externalities Delay;
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