This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Noussair, Charles
Silver, Jonathon

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4GNCGCC-2/2/68c6413720b1c387c20051ddd9a8b597
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 55 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 189-206
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:1:p:189-206

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. PARREIRAS, SŽrgio O. & RUBINCHIK-PESSACH, Anna, 2006. "Contests with heterogeneous agents," CORE Discussion Papers 2006004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  2. Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Richard B. Freeman, 2006. "Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament," NBER Working Papers 12588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Munetomo Ando, 2004. "Overconfidence in Economic Contests," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 708, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.