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The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies

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  • Wickelgren, Abraham L.

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  • Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2006. "The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 226-240, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:226-240
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Kenneth L. Judd, 1985. "Credible Spatial Preemption," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 153-166, Summer.
    3. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1996. "Capacity, Entry, and Forward Induction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 660-680, Winter.
    4. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    5. Barry Nalebuff, 1987. "Credible Pretrial Negotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 198-210, Summer.
    6. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1980. "Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 721-729, Autumn.
    7. Bulow, Jeremy & Geanakoplos, John & Klemperer, Paul, 1985. "Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry [The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence]," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 178-182, March.
    8. Larry Arvan, 1986. "Sunk Capacity Costs, Long-Run Fixed Costs, and Entry Deterrence under Complete and Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 105-121, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Xiao, Tiaojun & Qi, Xiangtong, 2010. "Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(2), pages 444-455, April.

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