Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 2000. "An extension of a theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern with an application to social choice theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 315-327, November.
- Karni, Edi, 2003. "On the Representation of Beliefs by Probabilities," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 17-38, January.
- HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
- James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
- Chambers,Robert G. & Quiggin,John, 2000.
"Uncertainty, Production, Choice, and Agency,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521785235, January.
- Chambers,Robert G. & Quiggin,John, 2000. "Uncertainty, Production, Choice, and Agency," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521622448.
- Quiggin, John & Chambers, Robert G., 1998. "A state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems with an application to point-source pollution control," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 441-472, December.
- Wakker, Peter, 1987. "Subjective probabilities for state dependent continuous utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 289-298, December.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1205, David K. Levine.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee, 2018.
"Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: When are actions implementable?,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 110-114.
- Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018. "Moral Hazard with Non-Additive Uncertainty: When are Actions Implementable?," Working Papers 201808, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Dionne, Georges & Vanasse, Charles, 1997.
"Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(1), pages 47-80, mars-juin.
- Dionne, G. & Vanasse, C., 1996. "Une evaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l'assurance automobile (1992) au Quebec," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 96-03, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
- G. Dionne & C. Vanasse, 1997. "Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l'assurance automobile (1992) au Québec," THEMA Working Papers 97-22, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000.
"A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs,"
Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 231-263, November.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 356, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," CEMA Working Papers 21, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, revised Oct 2000.
- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 1967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19356, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Simon Grant & Edi Karni, 2005.
"Why Does It Matter That Beliefs And Valuations Be Correctly Represented?,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(3), pages 917-934, August.
- Grant, S. & Karni, E., 2002. "Why Does it Matter that Beliefs and Valuations be Correctly Represented?," Other publications TiSEM 27a5efe4-2205-49cd-b879-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Grant, Simon & Karni, Edi, 2003. "Why Does It Matter That Beliefs and Valuations Be Correctly Represented?," Working Papers 2003-02, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Grant, S. & Karni, E., 2002. "Why Does it Matter that Beliefs and Valuations be Correctly Represented?," Discussion Paper 2002-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 1994.
"Corporate Diversification and Agency,"
Industrial Organization
9402001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Nov 1996.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Economics Working Papers E00-272, University of California at Berkeley.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Finance 9912001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 1994. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Economics Working Papers 94-227, University of California at Berkeley.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael, 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Research Program in Finance, Working Paper Series qt0p34c640, Research Program in Finance, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael L., 1994. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3568z5kq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-291, University of California at Berkeley.
- Kishore Gawande & Alok K. Bohara, 2005.
"Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(11), pages 1593-1609, November.
- kishore gawande & alok k. bohara, 2005. "Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard," Law and Economics 0505001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Daniel N. Deli, 2002. "Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 109-133, February.
- Edi Karni, 2008. "Agency theory: choice-based foundations of the parametrized distribution formulation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 337-351, September.
- Zhen Wang & Tomislav Vukina, 2017. "Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(3), pages 219-249, April.
- Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2017. "Gaming modeling of self-enforcing agreements and free-rider problem," MPRA Paper 80818, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Page, F H, Jr, 1991. "Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Principal-Agent Problems with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(4), pages 323-338, October.
- Kshitija Dixit & Rupayan Pal, 2010. "The impact of group incentives on performance of small firms: Hausman-Taylor estimates," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(6), pages 403-414.
- MacLeod, W. Bentley, 1992.
"Les contrats auto-exécutoires et la théorie des institutions du marché du travail,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(3), pages 433-451, septembre.
- MacLeod, B.W., 1991. "Les contracts auto-executoires et la theorie des institutions du marche du travail," Cahiers de recherche 9120, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- MacLeod, B.W., 1991. "Les contracts auto-executoires et la theorie des institutions du marche du travail," Cahiers de recherche 9120, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Chifeng Dai, 2022. "Optimal risk sharing with ex post private information: Rules versus discretion," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(1), pages 160-184, July.
- Martin Byford, 2003.
"Moral Hazard From Costless Hidden Actions,"
Working Papers
2003.03, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Martin Byford, 2003. "Moral Hazard From Costless Hidden Actions," Working Papers 2003.03 EDIRC Provider-In, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984.
"The Valuation of Assets under Moral Hazard,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(1), pages 229-238, March.
- Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "The Valuation of Assets under Moral Hazard," Finance 0411032, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Epstien, Gerald & Gintis, Herbert, 1989.
"International Capital Markets and the Limits of National Economic Policy,"
WIDER Working Papers
295606, United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Gerald Epstein & Herbert Gintis, 1989. "International Capital Markets and the Limits of National Economic Policy," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-1989-073, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Jed De Varo & Suraj Prasad, 2015.
"The Relationship between Delegation and Incentives Across Occupations: Evidence and Theory,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 279-312, June.
- DeVaro, Jed & Prasad, Suraj, 2013. "The Relationship Between Delegation and Incentives Across Occupations: Evidence and Theory," Working Papers 2013-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Grout, Paul & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2008.
"Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
08-17, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Grout, Paul & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2008. "Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment," IZA Discussion Papers 3685, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Paul A. Grout & Wendelin Schnedler, 2008. "Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/202, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Grout, Paul & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2008. "Non-profit organizations in a bureaucratic environment," Papers 08-17, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Rafel Crespí–Cladera & Carles Gispert, 2003. "Total Board Compensation, Governance and Performance of Spanish Listed Companies," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 17(1), pages 103-126, March.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:50:y:2005:i:1:p:28-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.