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Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games

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  • Slikker, Marco
  • Norde, Henk

Abstract

We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We show that with at most five players the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.Moreover, if the game is strictly convex then every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in a structure that is payoff equivalent to the full cooperation structure. Subsequently, we analyze a game with six players that is symmetric and strictly convex.We show that there exists a subgame Nash equilibrium that results in an incomplete structure in which two players are worse off than in the full cooperation structure, whereas four players are better off.Independent of the initial order any pair of players can end up being exploited.
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Suggested Citation

  • Slikker, Marco & Norde, Henk, 2004. "Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 171-200, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:171-200
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hamiache, Gerard, 1999. "A Value with Incomplete Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 59-78, January.
    2. Feinberg, Yossi, 1998. "An Incomplete Cooperation Structure for a Voting Game Can Be Strategically Stable," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 2-9, July.
    3. Borm, P.E.M. & Owen, G. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "On the position value for communication situations," Other publications TiSEM 5a8473e4-1df7-42df-ad53-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    5. Borm, P.E.M., 1990. "On game theoretic models and solution concepts," Other publications TiSEM c2fc22a4-5cb0-4517-9e53-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Slikker, M. & Gilles, R.P. & Norde, H.W. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "Directed Communication Networks," Discussion Paper 2000-84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Slikker, M. & Norde, H.W., 2004. "Symmetric Convex Games and Stable Structures," Discussion Paper 2004-114, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Slikker, M. & Gilles, R.P. & Norde, H.W. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "Directed Communication Networks," Other publications TiSEM 00f2df6e-3a8e-4ed3-84cf-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Slikker, Marco & Gilles, Robert P. & Norde, Henk & Tijs, Stef, 2005. "Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 55-80, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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