A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme
AbstractA vector of balanced weights infers an inequality that games with a nonempty core obey.This paper gives a generalization of the notion `vector of balanced weights'.Herewith it provides necessary and sufficient conditions to determine whether a TU-game has a population monotonic allocation scheme or not. Furthermore it shows that every 4-person integer valued game with a population monotonic allocation scheme has an integer valued population monotonic allocation scheme and it gives an example of a 7-person integer valued game that has only non-integer valued population monotonic allocation schemes.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 41 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Norde, H.W. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2000. "A Dual Description of the Class of Games with a Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme," Discussion Paper 2000-99, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Jesús Getán & Jesús Montes, 2010. "On cooperative games with large monotonic core," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 493-508, December.
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2008-6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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