Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 34 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert J. Leonard, 1995.
"From Parlor Games to Social Science: Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory, 1928-1994,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 33(2), pages 730-761, June.
- Robert J. Leonard, 1993. "From Von Neumann to Nash: Economics, Game Theory and Social Process," Cahiers de recherche du DÃ©partement des sciences Ã©conomiques, UQAM 9313, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Robert J. Leonard, 1993. "Reason, Ethics and Rigour: Morgenstern, Menger, and Mathematical Economics, 1928 - 1944," Cahiers de recherche du DÃ©partement des sciences Ã©conomiques, UQAM 9403, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Hart, Sergiu, 1992. "Games in extensive and strategic forms," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 19-40 Elsevier.
- AMIR, Rabah, 2001. "Stochastic games in economics and related fields: an overview," CORE Discussion Papers 2001060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Boros, E. & Gurvich, V., 2003. "On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of finite games with perfect information which may have cycles," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 207-241, October.
- McKinney, C. Nicholas & Van Huyck, John B., 2013. "Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 223-232.
- Ewerhart, Christian, 2002.
"Backward Induction and the Game-Theoretic Analysis of Chess,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 206-214, May.
- Ewerhart II, Christian, 2001. "Backward Induction and the Game-Theoretic Analysis of Chess," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-28, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Thomas Böhme & Frank Göring & Zsolt Tuza & Herwig Unger, 2009. "Learning of winning strategies for terminal games with linear-size memory," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 155-168, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.