On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions
AbstractEquilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprises.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 23 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Frutos, María Ángeles de & Rosenthal, Robert W., . "On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/6023, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Maria Angeles de Frutos & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1997. "On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions," Papers 0077, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Frutos, María Ángeles de & Rosenthal, R., . "On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-valued Auctions," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4418, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
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- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2010.
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- Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2000. "First Impressions in a Sequential Auction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1705, Econometric Society.
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