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On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions

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Author Info
Angeles de Frutos, Maria
Rosenthal, Robert W.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45JC9DG-1T/2/9ddd904ce8bb0f8dd8c2253db3b47959
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 23 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 201-221
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:201-221

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. S. Meij & L.-F. Pau, 2006. "Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 395-430, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Meij, S. & Pau, L-F. & Heck, H.W.G.M. van, 2003. "Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages," Research Paper ERS-2003-006-LIS Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  2. Masaki Aoyagi, 2005. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," ISER Discussion Paper 0645, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2000. "First Impressions in a Sequential Auction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1705, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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