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Why some forest rules are obeyed and others violated by farmers in Ghana: Instrumental and normative perspective of forest law compliance

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  • Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta
  • Hansen, Christian P.

Abstract

This paper explores farmers' compliance with forest rules in the High Forest Zone of Ghana and the factors influencing compliance through interviews with 226 farmers. Specifically, it assesses compliance with rules that regulate and/or prohibit: (i) felling of timber trees on farmlands, (ii) farming in forest reserves, and (iii) use and management of fire on farmlands. The results are based on self-reported responses about compliance with rules and indicate a high level of compliance with farming and bushfire rules, while the tree-felling rule is violated by many farmers. Compliance behaviour is influenced by numerous normative and instrumental factors, such as perceived fairness of rules, need for resources for livelihood and domestic use, and fear of sanction; but also, by some contextual factors, such as regulatory and socio-economic contexts. In the case of Ghana, efforts to strengthen forest law compliance, in particular the felling of trees on farmlands, need further consideration of the normative perspectives to compliance, and may point towards legal reforms that bring the legislation more in accordance with the norms held by farmers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Hansen, Christian P., 2012. "Why some forest rules are obeyed and others violated by farmers in Ghana: Instrumental and normative perspective of forest law compliance," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 46-54.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:23:y:2012:i:c:p:46-54
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2012.07.002
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    Cited by:

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    2. Osei-Tutu, Paul & Pregernig, Michael & Pokorny, Benno, 2015. "Interactions between formal and informal institutions in community, private and state forest contexts in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 26-35.
    3. Ameyaw, Joana & Arts, Bas & Wals, Arjen, 2016. "Challenges to responsible forest governance in Ghana and its implications for professional education," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 78-87.
    4. Carodenuto, Sophia & Cerutti, Paolo Omar, 2014. "Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) in Cameroon: Perceived private sector benefits from VPA implementation," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 55-62.
    5. Tegegne, Yitagesu T. & Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & FOBISSIE, KALAME & Visseren-Hamakers, Ingrid J. & Lindner, Marcus & Kanninen, Markku, 2017. "Synergies among social safeguards in FLEGT and REDD+ in Cameroon," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-11.
    6. Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Lovric, Marko & Mustalahti, Irmeli, 2019. "Mapping policy actor networks and their interests in the FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement in Lao PDR," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 128-148.
    7. Tegegne, Yitagesu Tekle & Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Kotilainen, Juha & Winkel, Georg & Haywood, Andrew & Almaw, Addisu, 2022. "What drives forest rule compliance behaviour in the Congo Basin? A study of local communities in Cameroon," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    8. Hajjar, Reem, 2015. "Advancing small-scale forestry under FLEGT and REDD in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 12-20.
    9. Osei-Tutu, Paul, 2017. "Taboos as informal institutions of local resource management in Ghana: Why they are complied with or not," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(P1), pages 114-123.
    10. Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Epstein, Graham, 2015. "The impacts of deterrence, social norms and legitimacy on forest rule compliance in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 10-20.

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