Rating model arbitrage in CDO markets: An empirical analysis
AbstractWe analyze whether information asymmetry between issuers and investors leads to rating model arbitrage in Collateralized Debt Obligation markets. Rating model arbitrage is defined as the issuer's deliberate capitalization of information asymmetry at the investor's cost on the basis of different rating processes. Using data from CDO transactions grouped by both rating agencies and underlying rating methodologies, we test for homogeneity of characteristic transaction features within the group and heterogeneity between the different groups. We find that the hypothesis stating non-existence of rating model arbitrage on the basis of information asymmetry does not hold as individual patterns of transaction characteristics within each group could be identified.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Financial Analysis.
Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166
Rating model arbitrage Collateralized Debt Obligations Asymmetric information;
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