Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes
AbstractA linear tax on an externality-generating activity may not attain the first-best social optimum. The problem arises because a monopolist's gain from improving the characteristics of a product may differ from social gian, even when consumers are willing to pay for change.Ã
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Energy Policy.
Volume (Year): 25 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Other versions of this item:
- Glazer, Amihai, 1997. "Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt4hx0h53n, University of California Transportation Center.
- Glazer, Amihai, 1997. "Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt1dc291j6, University of California Transportation Center.
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