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Searching for equilibrium positions in a game of political competition with restrictions

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  • Abellanas, Manuel
  • López, M Dolores
  • Rodrigo, Javier

Abstract

This paper considers a problem of political economy in which a Nash equilibrium study is performed in a proposed game with restrictions where the two major parties in a country vary their position within a politically flexible framework to increase their number of voters. The model as presented fits the reality of many countries. Moreover, it avoids the uniqueness of equilibrium positions. The problem is stated and solved from a geometric point of view.

Suggested Citation

  • Abellanas, Manuel & López, M Dolores & Rodrigo, Javier, 2010. "Searching for equilibrium positions in a game of political competition with restrictions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 201(3), pages 892-896, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:201:y:2010:i:3:p:892-896
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kramer, Gerald H, 1973. "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(2), pages 285-297, March.
    2. Barnett,William A. & Schofield,Norman & Hinich,Melvin (ed.), 1993. "Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521428316.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    4. H. A. Eiselt & Gilbert Laporte & Jacques-François Thisse, 1993. "Competitive Location Models: A Framework and Bibliography," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(1), pages 44-54, February.
    5. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-336, June.
    6. Abellanas, Manuel & Lillo, Isabel & Lopez, M Dolores & Rodrigo, Javier, 2006. "Electoral strategies in a dynamical democratic system. Geometric models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(2), pages 870-878, December.
    7. H C W L Williams & K S Kim, 1990. "Location-Spatial Interaction Models: 3. Competition between Organizations," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 22(10), pages 1281-1290, October.
    8. H C W L Williams & K S Kim, 1990. "Location-Spatial Interaction Models: 2. Competition between Independent Firms," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 22(9), pages 1155-1168, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Manuel Abellanas & Ma López & Javier Rodrigo & Isabel Lillo, 2011. "Weak equilibrium in a spatial model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 449-459, August.
    2. Bhattacharya, Bhaswar B. & Nandy, Subhas C., 2013. "New variations of the maximum coverage facility location problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(3), pages 477-485.
    3. Díaz-Báñez, J.M. & Heredia, M. & Pelegrín, B. & Pérez-Lantero, P. & Ventura, I., 2011. "Finding all pure strategy Nash equilibria in a planar location game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 214(1), pages 91-98, October.

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