Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
AbstractPartnership formation in cooperative games is studied, and binomial semivalues are used to measure the effects of such a type of coalition arising from an agreement between (a group of) players. The joint effect on the set of involved players is also compared with that of the alternative alliance formation. The simple game case is especially considered, and the application to a real life example illustrates the use of coalitional values closely related to the binomial semivalues when dealing with partnership formation and coalitional bargaining simultaneously.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.
Volume (Year): 192 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor
Cooperative game Coalition formation Partnership Binomial semivalue;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Guillermo Owen, 1972. "Multilinear Extensions of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 64-79, January.
- Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep & Puente, Maria Albina, 2003. "Semivalues as power indices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(3), pages 676-687, September.
- Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep, 1996. "Complete simple games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 139-155, October.
- Trine Tornøe Platz & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2009.
"Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations,"
10-24, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Sep 2010.
- Trine Tornøe Platz & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2013. "Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 208-228, 04.
- Carreras, Francesc & Giménez, José Miguel, 2011. "Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: Some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 211(1), pages 148-159, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.