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• Tamás Solymosi

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.

Volume (Year): 162 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 270-280
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:162:y:2005:i:1:p:270-280

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1. Tijs, S. & Branzei, R. & Solymosi, T., 2003. "Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games," Discussion Paper 19, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 447-460, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.